Host Authorization

Host authorization middleware for Fiber that validates the incoming Host header against a configurable allowlist. Protects against DNS rebinding attacks where an attacker-controlled domain resolves to the application's internal IP, causing browsers to send requests with a malicious Host header.

Signatures

func New(config ...Config) fiber.Handler

Examples

Import the middleware package:

import (
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3/middleware/hostauthorization"
)

Once your Fiber app is initialized, choose one of the following approaches:

Basic Usage

app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHosts: []string{"api.myapp.com"},
}))

app.Get("/users", func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
    return c.JSON(getUsers())
})

// Host: api.myapp.com → 200 OK
// Host: evil.com      → 403 Forbidden

Subdomain Wildcards

A *. prefix matches any subdomain but not the bare domain itself:

app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHosts: []string{"*.myapp.com"},
}))

// Host: api.myapp.com  → 200 OK
// Host: www.myapp.com  → 200 OK
// Host: myapp.com      → 403 Forbidden

To allow both the bare domain and all subdomains, include both:

AllowedHosts: []string{"myapp.com", "*.myapp.com"},

Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)

Browsers always transmit the Host header in ASCII (Punycode) form, so IDN entries in AllowedHosts are converted to Punycode at startup. You can configure entries in either form — they are equivalent:

AllowedHosts: []string{"münchen.example.com"}                 // Unicode
AllowedHosts: []string{"xn--mnchen-3ya.example.com"}          // Punycode (what the browser sends)

Both match an incoming request whose Host header is xn--mnchen-3ya.example.com.

Skipping Health Checks

Use Next to bypass host validation for specific paths:

app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHosts: []string{"myapp.com", "*.myapp.com"},
    Next: func(c fiber.Ctx) bool {
        return c.Path() == "/healthz"
    },
}))

// Host: evil.com GET /healthz → 200 OK (skipped)
// Host: evil.com GET /users   → 403 Forbidden

Dynamic Validation

Use AllowedHostsFunc for hosts that can't be known at startup:

app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHostsFunc: func(host string) bool {
        // Look up tenant domains from database, cache, etc.
        return isRegisteredTenant(host)
    },
}))

AllowedHostsFunc is only called when static AllowedHosts don't match, so you can combine both:

app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHosts: []string{"myapp.com", "*.myapp.com"},
    AllowedHostsFunc: func(host string) bool {
        return isRegisteredCustomDomain(host)
    },
}))

Custom Error Response

The default response is 403 Forbidden. 421 Misdirected Request (RFC 9110 §15.5.20) is a semantically closer choice for "wrong host for this server" — CDNs like Cloudflare and Fastly use it for this case. Either is reasonable; pick one via ErrorHandler:

// 403 with a JSON body
app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHosts: []string{"myapp.com"},
    ErrorHandler: func(c fiber.Ctx, err error) error {
        return c.Status(fiber.StatusForbidden).JSON(fiber.Map{
            "error": "unauthorized host",
        })
    },
}))

// 421 Misdirected Request — closer to the RFC-defined semantics
app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHosts: []string{"myapp.com"},
    ErrorHandler: func(c fiber.Ctx, _ error) error {
        return c.SendStatus(fiber.StatusMisdirectedRequest) // 421
    },
}))

Combined with Domain() Router

hostauthorization acts as a security gate; Domain() handles routing:

// Security layer — reject anything not from our hosts
app.Use(hostauthorization.New(hostauthorization.Config{
    AllowedHosts: []string{"myapp.com", "*.myapp.com"},
    Next: func(c fiber.Ctx) bool {
        return c.Path() == "/healthz"
    },
}))

// Routing layer — direct allowed hosts to the right handlers
app.Domain("api.myapp.com").Get("/users", listUsers)
app.Domain(":tenant.myapp.com").Get("/dashboard", tenantDashboard)
app.Get("/healthz", healthCheck)

Config

Property	Type	Description	Default
Next	func(fiber.Ctx) bool	Defines a function to skip this middleware when returned true.	nil
AllowedHosts	[]string	List of permitted hosts. Supports exact match and subdomain wildcard (*.example.com).	nil
AllowedHostsFunc	func(string) bool	Dynamic validator called only when no static AllowedHosts rule matches. Receives the normalized hostname: port stripped, trailing dot removed, IPv6 brackets removed, lowercased, IDN converted to Punycode.	nil
ErrorHandler	fiber.ErrorHandler	Called when a request is rejected. Receives ErrForbiddenHost as the error.	403

Either AllowedHosts or AllowedHostsFunc (or both) must be provided. The middleware panics at startup if neither is set.

Default Config

var ConfigDefault = Config{}

There is no useful default — you must provide at least AllowedHosts or AllowedHostsFunc.

Host Matching

The middleware matches hosts in this order:

1. Exact match — case-insensitive, port and trailing dot stripped, IDN labels in Punycode form
2. Subdomain wildcard — "*.myapp.com" matches api.myapp.com but not myapp.com
3. AllowedHostsFunc — called only if no static rule matched

The first match wins. If nothing matches, ErrorHandler is called.

Host Normalization

Before matching, both incoming hosts and AllowedHosts entries are normalized at startup:

• Port is stripped (example.com:8080 → example.com)
• Trailing dot removed (example.com. → example.com)
• IPv6 brackets removed ([::1] → ::1)
• Lowercased
• IDN labels converted to ASCII/Punycode (münchen.example.com → xn--mnchen-3ya.example.com)
• RFC 1035 length limits enforced at startup: ≤253 chars total, ≤63 chars per label (panic on violation)

Filtering by Client IP

This middleware filters by the Host header, not by the client's source IP. To restrict access by client IP, use Fiber's TrustProxy / TrustProxyConfig configuration — those are the correct knobs for IP allowlisting and CIDR ranges of trusted proxies.

Proxy Support

The middleware uses Fiber's c.Hostname(), which respects X-Forwarded-Host when TrustProxy is enabled. When TrustProxy is disabled (the default), X-Forwarded-Host is ignored and the raw Host header is used.

fasthttp itself is HTTP/1.x only. HTTP/2 support requires an external library (e.g. fasthttp2) plugged in via Server.NextProto. Those libraries are responsible for mapping the HTTP/2 :authority pseudo-header to a Host value before the request reaches Fiber handlers, so the middleware should work transparently once H2 is wired up — but this is the H2 library's responsibility, not fasthttp's or this middleware's.

RFC Compliance

• RFC 9110 Section 7.2 — Host and port are separate components; port is stripped before matching
• RFC 9110 Section 17.1 — Origin servers should reject misdirected requests
• RFC 9112 Section 3.2 — Requests with missing Host headers should be rejected
• RFC 1035 — AllowedHosts entries are validated against the 253-char total / 63-char per-label limits
• Returns 403 Forbidden (not 400) because the request is syntactically valid but semantically unauthorized

note

RFC 9110 §15.5.20 defines 421 Misdirected Request as a semantically closer response for host mismatches ("the request was directed at a server unable or unwilling to produce an authoritative response for the target URI"). CDNs like Cloudflare and Fastly use 421 for this case. To use 421 instead of 403, set a custom ErrorHandler:

ErrorHandler: func(c fiber.Ctx, err error) error {
    return c.SendStatus(fiber.StatusMisdirectedRequest) // 421
},